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Copyright Law—Definition of "Posthumous Work" Under Section
24 of the Copyright Act of 1909—Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes,
Inc.'—In 1943, Bela Bartok assigned his rights 2 in his recently com-
pleted musical composition, Concerto for Orchestra, to Boosey &
Hawkes, Inc., a music publisher. 3 The agreement provided that
Boosey would complete the printing and copyright the composition
within six months. Wartime conditions, however, delayed the printing
process and thus the copyrighting by almost two years," During this
period, the Concerto was performed six times and broadcast over the
radio,' receiving great acclaim. 6 The printing was finally completed in
June, 1945 and Boosey copyrighted the work in March, 1946, six
months after Bartok's death in September of 1945. 7
The first statutory copyright term expired in March, 1974. Both
Boosey and Peter Bartok, a son of the composer, filed timely renewal
applications with the United States Register of Copyrights 6 pursuant
to section 24 of the Copyright Act.° The Register accepted both appli-
cations, expressly declining to adjudicate between them.'° Peter Bar-
tok thereafter brought an action in federal district court" claiming
that as one of the "children of the author," he was entitled to the re-
newal copyright on Concerto for Orchestra' 2 under section 24 of the
Copyright Act.' 3 Boosey filed a counterclaim and cross-claim asserting
' 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
2
 The assignment was subject to the payment of royalties. Id. at 954 n.8 (dissent-
ing opinion).
3
 523 F.2d at 943. Bela Bartok was impoverished at this time, Bartok v. Boosey &
Hawkes, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 880, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and suffering from leukemia
which caused his death in 1945. 523 F.2d at 943.
4 523 F.2d at 943.
"Id.
°See Bartok, 382 F. Supp. at 882. The Concerto has since become a repertory sta-
ple of orchestras throughout the world. Id.
523 F.2d at 943. There was no suggestion that the publisher purposefully de-
layed publication until after Bartok's death: "[Plublication here probably would have
occurred in Bartok's lifetime had London not been extensively bombed and mail deliv-
ery extensivelydelayed."./d. at 947 n.10.
"Id. at 943. The renewal period is the twenty-eighth year of the original
copyright term. During this time, anyone who is entitled to the renewal must file an
application for renewal with the Copyright Office. In the absence of a valid application
for renewal, the work falls into the public domain. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). See Brown,
Renewal Rights in Copyright, 28 C0RNE1.1. L.Q. 460, 466, 470 (1943).
" 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
10 523 F.2d at 943.
" Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
12 1d. at 882.
13
 17 U.S.C. §24 (1970). Section 24 provides in pertinent part:
That in the case of any posthumous work ... upon which the
copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof ... the pro-
prietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of
the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years ....
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its renewal rights as the proprietor" of a "posthumous work" under
an exception in section 24) 5
 Suchoff, the trustee of Bela Bartok's es-
tate, also counterclaimed and cross-claimed for judgment declaring
that the estate was entitled to the renewal royalties since the Concerto
was a "posthumous work" and since Boosey had previously agreed to
pay royalties to the estate during the renewal term."
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court de-
fined a "posthumous work" as one that was published and copy-
righted after the author's death." - Therefore, the court held, the
Concerto is a "posthumous work" and the publisher Boosey is entitled
to renew the copyright for the second twenty-eight year period."
Recognizing that the Copyright Act does not define "posthumous
work," the district court based its decision on the definitions used by
the Register of Copyrights, the dictionary, and the publishers of
Chopin's works. 19
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, re-
jecting the authorities relied on by the district court, reversed and in a
split decision HELD: A "posthumous work" under section 24 of the
Copyright Act is a work on which the right to copyright has passed by
will or intestacy due to the absence of an effective assignment by the
author during his lifetime.29
 Applying this definition, the court
reasoned that the Concerto is not a "posthumous work" since Bartok
had executed an assignment to Boosey of the right to copyright dur-
ing his lifetime. Therefore, the court concluded that the renewal
rights in the Concerto reverted back to Bartok's widow and children
under the general scheme of section 24 of the Act." In defining
"posthumous work," the court focused on the legislative purpose be-
hind the renewal provision, as evidenced by the House Committee
Report, 22
 and concluded that the general renewal scheme reveals a
Congressional intent to give the author or, if the author died prior to
And provided further, that in the case of any other copyrighted work ... the
author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of
the author, if the author be not living, ... shall be entitled to a renewal
and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-
eight years ... ."
" Under the present Copyright Act, the term "proprietor" is synonymous with
the term "assigns." Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 F. 562, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(Hand, J.). A proprietor or assignee succeeds to the author's rights under common law or
statutory copyright. I M. NIMMER. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §§ 61, 61.3 (1975).
" 382 F. Supp. at 822. See note 13 supra.
"523 F.2d at 942. Under a 1949 agreement between Peter Bartok, Mrs. Bartok
and Boosey, the publisher consented to pay royalties during the renewal term to the es-
tate which, pursuant to the provisions of Bartok's will, pays the proceeds to Mrs. Bartok
for life, with a remainder to her sons. Id. at 942 n.2. See text at notes 134-38 infra.
" 382 F. Supp. at 884.
" Id.
" Id.
2° 523 F.2d at 044-45, 947.
" Id. at 944, 946.
22 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
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the renewal period, his family, the right to renew the work. 23 The
court therefore assumed that Congress included the "posthumous
work" exception to withhold unnecessary protection for the author's
family because in dealing with a "posthumous work," the family can
negotiate the primary contract for the sale of the copyright themselves
since the author had not done so during his lifetime." The signifi-
cance of the Bartok case lies in the fact that the court's explication of
the "posthumous work" exception was the first attempted by a circuit
court in the history of American copyright taw."
This note will analyze and evaluate the Bartok decision, discus-
sing first the history of federal copyright legislation and the provisions
for copyright renewal. Emphasis will be placed on the legislative pur-
pose behind the enactment of the renewal provision in the Copyright
Act of 1909. An analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Bartok will be presented which, in turn, will be followed by an evalua-
tion of the competing views expressed in the case. In conclusion, it
will he submitted that the majority's interpretation of "posthumous
work" in Bartok is the most appropriate definition since it emphasizes
the nature of the execution of a contract, the assignment of legal
rights, and the process of publication, rather than focusing simply on
the actual date of publication as did the district court.
I. RENEWAL RIGH -1S UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1909
The first copyright legislation in the United States was enacted
by Congress in 1790," pursuant to Article 1, section 8 of the
Constitution." Based on the English Statute of Anne, 22 the Act of
1790 created a two-term copyright scheme—a fourteen year original
term that could be followt.d by a fourteen year renewal term if the
applicant complied with the statutory renewal formalities." If the au-
thor died before the end of the original term, the Act provided for
renewal by the author's assignee or, in the absence of such an inter
vivos transfer, by the author's estate. 3° The Act of 1831 31 was the first
general revision of the 1790 copyright law. This Act extended the
original copyright term to twenty-eight years and amended the re-
newal section to provide that the right to renewal would pass to the
23 523 F.2d at 944.
24 1d.
25 Id. at 943 & n.3.
" Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124,
27
 Congress is authorized "Edo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § S.
28
 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710).
U Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
" Id.
31 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 436.
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author's widow and children if the author did not survive the original
term. 32
The next revision of the copyright law was in the Copyright Act
of 1909, which is still in effect today. 33 The major issue presented in
the hearings on this bill concerning renewal rights was whether a
single copyright term, lasting for the life of the author plus fifty
years, was preferable to the existing two-term scheme. 34 Significant
reasons could be advanced in favor of the single term proposal. The
prevailing practice throughout the world both then and now was to
afford copyright protection for a single term only; 35
 generally, for the
life of the author plus fifty years. 3° The benefit of this system is that
the author is in a better bargaining position regarding sale of the
copyright since the purchaser is assured of receiving the entire in-
terest in the work, rather than having his interest defeated if the au-
thor dies prior to the renewal period.37
 The disadvantage of this sys-
tem, however, is that sale of the copyright by the author terminates
his entire interest in the work, thus allowing a proprietor to pay little
for the copyright and reap large profits later if the work should prove
popular. 3 ° Furthermore, extensions of the original copyright term
prohibit works which are not sufficiently remunerative from falling
into the public domain at the earliest possible date. 3° Congress was
persuaded by the latter rationale in enacting the 1909 Copyright Act
and continued the two-term scheme." In doing so, Congress main-
32 /d. § 2. This Act created the renewal system which "in its basic form, has been
continued even to the present statute." See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 574-75
(1956).
33
 Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075. Except for the
addition of the Family's right to renew if the author died prior to the renewal period
and the extension of the renewal term, the law and theory on renewal rights have re-
mained consistent throughout the history of the copyright law. Brown, Renewal Rights in
Copyright, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 461 (1943).
34 See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 652 (1943).
38
 S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1975). The United States and the
Phillipines are the only exceptions to this practice. Id.
" Id. Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention requires adoption of this
term. Id.
" Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 46 (1955).
Bricker further observed that although the author is in a poor bargaining position in
negotiating for the renewal term — which destroys the legislative purpose of benefiting
the author and family — it is undesirable to prevent assignment of the renewal expect-
ancy. Since a twenty-eight year term may be too short to assure a fair return on the
purchaser's investment, nonrecognition of renewal assignments could deter publishers
from handling any works of unknown authors. He therefore advocates the creation of a
one term system. Id.
38
 See text at notes 54-58 infra.
" See Note, 44 CoLum L. REV, 712, 735 (1944), rejecting extention of the original
term and elimination of the renewal term. Id.
40 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909). However, the two-term
system is rejected in the copyright revision bill that is currently before Congress. See S.
REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1975). The bill provides that "copyright in a
work created on or after January 1, 1977, subsists from its creation and ... endures for
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tained the original term of twenty-eight years, extended the renewal
period from fourteen to twenty-eight years, and simplified the for-
malities of renewal."
The general renewal scheme in section 24 provides for a rever-
sion of the renewal rights to the author or, if the author has died, to
his surviving spouse, children or other designated beneficiaries at the
end of the original twenty-eight year term:
The author ... , if still living, or the widow, widower, or
children of the author, if the author be not living, ... or if
such [persons] be not living, then the author's executor, or
.. his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and exten-
sion of the copyright for a further term of twenty-eight
42years
Section 24 includes four exceptions to this general renewal scheme,
however. In those cases, the proprietor of the original copyright re-
tains the copyright interest and no reversion to the author or his fam-
ily occurs:
[I]n the case of any posthumous work or	 composite
work ... or ... work copyrighted by a corporate body ...
or by an employer for whom such work is made for hire,
the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a re-
newal and extension of the copyright in such work for the
further term of twenty-eight years ... . 43
In asserting its right to the renewal copyright in the Bartok case,
Boosey sought to avoid the general reversion scheme of section 24 by
contending that the Concerto fell within the "posthumous work" excep-
tion to the provision."
The interpretation of "posthumous work" is not an easy task.
Section 24 does not define the term. Moreover, analysis of the provi-
sion is especially difficult since there is a scarcity of judicial opinions
dealing with it, probably because only within the past twenty-five
years, have many works maintained any value past the original
a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after his death." S. 22, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 302(a) (1975). The bill includes a safeguard against unremunerative
transfer by providing for divisibility of copyright. The copyright comprises five exclu-
sive rights, each of which may be separately assigned. See id. §1 106, 20I(d). In addition,
an "exclusive or nonexclusive grant of aster or license of copyright or of any right
under a copyright, executed by the author ... is subject to termination" under specified
conditions. See id. § 203(a). The Senate has passed the bill, thus adopting a single
copyright term for the life of the author plus fifty years. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §
302(a) (1975). Enactment of this bill will thus extend the original term and eliminate
the renewal• term, bringing United States copyright law in line with that of other coun-
tries, except the Phillipmes.
" Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 24 (1970)).
42 17 U,S.C. § 24 (1970).
" Id.
44 523 F.2d at 942.
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twenty-eight year term. 45
 Nor has the legislature given much attention
to the Copyright Act" even though commentators and judges have
continually criticized the 1909 Act as being "poorly drafted" 47 and
"hardly unambiguous.""R Therefore, interpretation of the "posthu-
mous work" exception must begin with an understanding of both the
mechanics of section 24 and the legislative purpose behind enactment
of this provision in 1909.
The 1909 House Judiciary Committee Report" on the Act ex-
plains that the primary purpose of the renewal term is to afford to
the author, or to the successive classes enumerated by statute if the
author died prior to the expiration of the original term, 5° a second
chance to benefit economically from the work." Accordingly, the re-
newal term is not a mere extension or renewal of the property in-
terest represented by the original copyright. 52 Rather, it is a separate
estate, "clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the orig-
inal copyright."53
 There are conflicting views as to the legislative
rationale for providing a reversion of the copyright interest. One view
is that, unlike other forms of personal property, the nature of
copyright precludes an "accurate monetary evaluation prior to its
45
 Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (1955). The
advent of radio broadcasting, television and motion pictures revived interest in old
works that could be adapted to the new medium of expression. See Silverman v. Sunrise
Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758-59 (1923);
Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, 28 ConNEt.t. L.Q. 460, 466 (1943). Despite this in-
terest in older works, only 9.5% of all original copyrights obtained in 1927 were renewed
in 1954.1 GUINAN. JR., DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 24 (1957).
" The few bills that have been introduced on copyright revision neglected to
deal with the "posthumous work" exception despite a consistent call from commentators
for an explanation of the term. See, e.g., 2 M. INIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 114.1
(1975). Thus, the bills included the same provision for proprietor renewal of the
copyright on a "posthumous work." See Bartok, 382 F. Supp. at 884. For discussion of
the pending bill, see note 40 supra.
4 T Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL L. REV. 23 (1955).
" De Syl v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956).
49 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
°° See text at note 42 supra. Section 24 thus provides that if the author is dead, the
renewal rights do not pass under the usual rules of testamentary or intestate succes-
sion. Instead, they pass to certain enumerated classes of beneficiaries. 17 U.S.C. § 24
(1970).
51 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
52 "[The proprietor of an existing copyright as such has no right to a renewal."
Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909, 911 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 262
U.S. 758-59 (1923).
as G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc„ 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247,
249 (1st Cir.• 1911); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Southern
Music Publishing Co. v. Bibo-Lang, 10 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). The Fifth Circuit
has described the renewal term as a "second recognition" extended by the law to the au-
thor of work that has proven permanently meritorious by giving directly to him, if
alive, or, if not, to his widow, children, or next of kin or executor ... a supplementary
copyright upon the terms stated in the statute. Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370,
371 (5th Cir. 1934).
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exploitation."Ü Since the inability to predict the future success of the
work puts the author in a poor bargaining position in negotiating a
contract for exploitation during the original copyright term, reserva-
tion of the renewal term for the author or his family provides a "sec-
ond chance" to negotiate an advantageous contract for a successful
work." The second view is that the reversion of the renewal term is
part of the legislative scheme to protect widows and children from the
improvidence of authors" who, due to their lack of business
acumen,57
 often sell their rights outright for a small sum to publishers
who later reap large profits from the work."
Whether the first or second view is accepted, reversion of the
renewal rights is not automatic since an assignment of the renewal
rights made prior to the renewal period will be binding if the author
is alive at the commencement of the renewal period." The rationale
of this rule is that an author should have the same freedom to dispose
of his property as other persons." Since the assignment is of an ex-
pectancy, however, it is not valid if the author dies prior to the re-
newal period since he would not be entitled to renew the copyright.'"
In that case, renewal rights vest in those classes succeeding under the
statute, regardless of any assignment made by the author.
" 2 M. N1MMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 113 (1975). See Bartok, 523 F.2d at
944-45.
35 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIG1IT 113 (1975).
se Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1941).
" M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 955 (2d Cir.
1942) (Frank, J., dissenting), aff'd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Bricker, Renewal and Extension of
Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 27 (1955).
58 White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911).
'9 Miller Music Corp. v. Chas. N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960); see Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943). However, a pur-
ported assignment of renewal rights may be invalid even though the author survived to
the renewal period. For example, the court will not view an assignment of a copyright
in general terms as including a conveyance of the renewal interest. 318 U.S. at 653. Nor
will circumstances justifying a finding that the original copyright has been transferred
be viewed as sufficient for validating an alleged transfer of the renewal rights. Rossiter
v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1943). Moreover, the court will assess the adequacy
of the consideration paid for the renewal right in determining whether to enforce the
assignment. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 954 (2d
Cir. 1942), affd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
"° Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943).
Commentators argue that this rule undermines the basic rationale of the renewal provi-
sion by legally recognizing an assignment made by an author at a time when accurate
assessment of the value of the renewal copyright may be impossible. See, e.g., 2 M.
NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 117.21 (1975). One commentator supports the
author's right to assign the renewal rights by stating that the committee report on the
1909 Act, H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1909), sought only to pre-
vent an outright sale of the copyright from carrying the renewal rights rather than to
prevent the author from specifically assigning the renewal term. Brown, Renewal Rights
in Copyright, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 468 (1943).
Miller Music Corp. v. Chas. N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
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II. AN
 ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE BARTOK DECISION
In holding that a "posthumous work" is one in which no effec-
tive assignment has been made by the author during his lifetime, the
court in Bartok advanced four reasons in support of its decision. First,
the court relied on the reversion of the copyright interest to the au-
thor or statutory beneficiaries under the general renewal scheme in
section 24, reasoning that fulfillment of the legislative purpose behind
the "posthumous work" provision required application of that excep-
tion only where the author did not execute a contract for copyright
during his life." Since under the general scheme, the renewal rights
pass to the family if the author dies prior to the start of the renewal
period, Congress must have concluded that protection of the family's
renewal interest would be unnecessary in the limited case of a "post-
humous work" since the family could make its own contract for the
sale of the original copyright and thus guard its interests. 83 This is
true, the court reasoned, because if the author has not executed a
contract during his lifetime, then no publisher has any interest in the
work unless granted such by the deceased author's family."
It is submitted, however, that the family is in no better position
to evaluate the future success of the work than was the author. Thus,
the same considerations that led Congress to provide in the renewal
scheme for reversion of the renewal rights to the author or his
family" and led the courts to invalidate an author's assignment of the
renewal rights if he died prior to the renewal period" apply as
strongly when the family itself negotiates the original contract for
copyright. Yet Congress did not so provide. When dealing with a
"posthumous work," the exception in section 24 requires that the fam-
ily assess the value of the renewal term when it negotiates the original
contract, since the renewal rights will automatically vest in the pro-
prietor of the copyright. Nor is it likely that the proprietor will agree
to a large sum in consideration for the renewal term since he gener-
ally cannot evaluate its worth either. If the renewal rights in a "post-
humous work" vested in the author's children or next succeeding class
62 523 F.2d ut 944.
68 Id.
64 Id.
65 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909). See text at notes 49-58
supra.
66
 In Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943), a case
dealing with whether the author's right to the renewal term is assignable at all prior to
the renewal period, the Court observed that the statute placed no limitations on the as-
signability of the renewal interest. Id. at 647. However, in a subsequent case, dealing
with an author's assignment of the renewal rights followed by the author's death prior to
the renewal period, the Court held that the assignment was invalid when the author
died before the end of the first term. The total renewal rights then passed to the
author's family or the next succeeding classes enumerated in the statute. Miller Music
Corp. v. Chas. N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
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instead of in the proprietor of the original copyright, they would then
be given the "second chance," provided to the family dealing with a
nonposthumous work and to the surviving author absent a valid as-
signment, to benefit from a "work that has proven permanently
meritorious."' Nevertheless, the statute provides an exception to the
general renewal scheme for any "posthumous work" and the court is
required to recognize it.
The majority in Bartok next reasoned that its own definition of
"posthumous work" was the most appropriate because it avoids the
creation of an illogical distinction between the family of an author
who executed a contract for copyright prior to his death and the fam-
ily of an author who had not made such a contract. 08 The majority
emphasized that under the district court's definition of
"posthumous"—which focused on Whether publication occurred be-
fore death—the family of an author who had already assigned his
rights in the work would be denied all protection since it could not
negotiate for royalties during either the original copyright term or the
renewal term." Futhermore, if publication after the author's death
always defeated the family's right of renewal, a publisher could inten-
tionally delay the printing of the work in hopes that the author would
die prior to publication. 70 It appears that this reasoning is supported
by logic and considerations of justice. Any other definition of "post-
humous work" would create an unreasonable discrimination between
families in equally defenseless positions and permit an unscrupulous
publisher to benefit at the family's expense.
The court thirdly supported its definition of "posthumous work"
by arguing that the rationale for its interpretation of the term is con-
' sistent with the imputed purpose behind inclusion of the other excep-
tions in section 24. 7 ' The court explained that where the rights have
passed by will or intestacy, delays in settling the estate may postpone
sale of the copyright for several years. Thus, when the renewal period
vests twenty-eight years later, there may be no surviving children of
the author. The court therefore reasoned that the difficulty of locat-
ing all the author's heirs in the case of a "posthumous work" was simi-
lar to the inconvenience of locating all contributors in a "composite
work" or the problem of identifying the creator of a "work made for
hire."72 The court thus assumed that a recognition of this shared in-
convenience motivated the legislature to create the statutory excep-
" Harris V. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1934).
88 523 F.2d at 944-45.
6U Id.
76 1d. at 946.
"Id. at 947-48. Section 24 includes exceptions to the renewal scheme for "any
posthumous work ... composite work work copyrighted by a corporate body ... or
by an employer for whom such work is made for hire." In these cases, "the proprietor
of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such
work for the further term of twenty-eight years." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
" 523 F.2d at 948.
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tions that allow the proprietor of the original copyright to renew the
copyright for any posthumous work, composite work or work made
for hire.
It is submitted that the court inappropriately imputed a common
rationale to the exceptions in section 24 since these exceptions do not
present analogous situations. Unlike the author of a "posthumous
work," the contributor to a composite work does not lose the renewal
rights. Rather, the contributor can renew his individual work and the
proprietor presumably can renew the composite work." Nor is the
"employee for hire" exception analogous to the "posthumous work"
exception. Unlike, an "employee for hire," who receives a salary to
produce the work, an author of a "posthumous work" does not gen-
erally receive any compensation from the proprietor of the copyright
while he is creating the work. Nor does the proprietor of a "post-
humous work"' motivate the production, as does the employer in the
case of a "work for hire." 74 Thus, the majority's attempted justifica-
tion for the "posthumous work" exception fails to recognize the dif-
ferences between renewals of those works and renewals of other
works excepted under section 24.
Moreover,	 submitted that the majority's imposition of a trust
upon proprietors' receipts from renewals of copyrights"—for the
benefit of the statutory recipients—demonstrates the unsoundness of
its view that the difficulty of locating the author's heirs justifies the
"posthumous work" exception in section 24. 76 Absent this trust
scheme, invalidation of the proprietor's renewal would cast the work
into the public dormain due to the lack of an effective renewal applica-
tion during the renewal period, and thus would deprive the ben-
eficiaries of all proceeds from the renewal term. 77 This same evil
could result absent the "posthumous work" exception. However, it too
could be averted I by application of the trust mechanism. Thus, if the
heirs were entitled to the renewal rights, one heir could renew the
work and hold the title in trust for the other heirs." Then the other
heirs could claims their rights against the one who renewed the work.
Furthermore, as in Bartok, the time between the author's death and
the copyrighting of the work may be so short that the same individu-
" See id.
" Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 997 (1972).
" 523 F.2d at 948-49.
" See text at notes 71-72 supra.
" See 523 F.2d at 948-49. The dissent warned of this result, id. at 952-53,
motivating the majority to impose the trust. Id. at 948.
7°
	
Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1921), cert.
denied, 262 U.S. '758;59 (1923); Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent Trends in the Law of Artis-
tic Property, 4 U.C.U.A. L. REV. 323, 334-35 (1957). Assignability of the renewal term
would not be effected because once the renewal rights vested, the heir who exercised
the rights could assign the renewal term to a third party and hold the proceeds in trust
for the other heirs. Cf. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 646-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), afj'd., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
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als would be alive when the renewal rights vest, whether the author or
the family negotiated the original assignment.
The majority finally reasoned that the term "publication" has "a
variety of definitions in the Copyright Act depending upon the
context," 7 ll and that the district court inappropriately relied upon the
definition of "publication" for statutory copyright purposes in inter-
preting section 24, the renewal provision. 8° The court suggested that
even under the district court's definition of "posthumous work," the
Concerto may have been "published" prior to Bartok's death, although
this "publication" was not sufficient to deprive the work of common
law copyright protection. 8 ' Thus, without specifically so holding, the
court created the possibility that public dissemination of a work
through its performance during the author's lifetime will be sufficient
to take the work out of the "posthumous work" category."
Although this description is consistent with the common usage of
"publication"—the act(s) of making something known to the
public83—it nevertheless conflicts with previous judicial pronounce-
ments that a live performance or radio broadcast does not constitute
publication of the work. 84 However, in those cases, the courts based
their definitions of publication on a desire to preserve the author's
common law copyright: if the performances were "publication" of the
work, the work would fall into the public domain since the author had
not given notice of statutory copyright." Thus, "performance" was
?" 523 F.2d at 945. For example, the courts require more open dissemination of a
work subject to common law copyright protection before holding . that publication has
occurred than where statutory copyright protects the work. American Visuals Corp. v.
Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir. 1956).
8 8 523 F.2d at 945, 947.
Al Id. at 945-46. "Publication," when used for purposes of deciding if the work is
eligible for statutory copyright protection, occurs "when by consent of the copyright
owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away, or
otherwise made available to the general public ...." 1 M. NIMMER, THE LAw OF
COPYRIGHT § 49 (1975).
" 523 F.2d at 945-46. This suggestion is not novel. Barbara Ringer, present Reg-
ister of Copyrights, raised the issue of whether a work is posthumous if it was "pub-
licly disseminated during the author's lifetime (by public performance, broadcast or re-
cordings) but not published in visual copies until after his death ...." B. Ringer,
Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 524 n. 155 (1963). Professor Nimmer
advocates including among posthumous works "only those which have received no pub-
lic dissemination in any form during the author's life." 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAw or
COPYRIGHT § 114.1 (1975).
83 Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1938).
" Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912); Nutt v. National Institute for the
Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929); King v. Mister Maestro,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); McCarthy & Fisher, Inc. v. White, 259 F.
364, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
" See cases cited at note 84 supra. Once "publication" occurs, the law imposes a
forfeiture of common law copyright since a work cannot command both common law
and statutory protection. 1 M. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT § 46 (1975). Neverthe-
less, commentators have argued that performance should result in loss of common law
copyright since performance may bring the most substantial economic returns to the
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only related to "publication" in deciding whether a work would corn-
mand statutory or common law copyright. It is submitted that applica-
tion of the common usage of "publication" is nevertheless inappro-
priate since it has no necessary relation to statutory copyright law.
Moreover, since the term "publication" is "clouded by semantic
confusion,"86
 its adoption in the renewal scheme would only create
additional uncertainty in the area.
The majority lastly announced that, with the exception of the
present parties, the decision will be applicable to only future and
pending renewals. 87 Judge Van Graafeiland began his dissenting
argument by complaining of the injustice to Mrs. Bartok that results
from the majority's decision to apply its holding to the parties in
Bartok." Instead of receiving the entire royalty proceeds during her
lifetime, Mrs. Bartok now will receive only a one-third share. 89
Moreover, he argued, this injustice is unwarranted. Since
numerous illustrations of the common usage of "posthumous" as
"published after the author's death" 9° exist, it must be assumed that
Congress gave "posthumous work" its common meaning." Conse-
quently, an examination of the legislative history was unnecessary in
light of elementary rules of statutory construction which afford to
statutory language its ordinary meaning." Even if legislative history
was considered, he asserted, it did not indicate that the legislature
used "posthumous" in a manner different than its common usage."
He further contended that since the Copyright Office had adopted
author. Id. § 53.1; J. GUINAN. JR., DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 23 (1957).
Bartok does not raise this issue since no infringement occurred subsequent to the per-
formance and prior to receipt of statutory copyright which would question whether the
author forfeited his common law copyright protection before obtaining statutory pro-
tection. Nor did anyone contest the initial copyright that was taken out by Boosey.
Furthermore, since both Peter Bartok and Boosey tiled renewal applications, the work
would not fall into the public domain after the termination of the initial twenty-eight
year term because one of the applications was undoubtedly valid. Thus, the sole issue
presented in Bartok was which renewal application was valid. The application filed by
Peter Bartok (that was accepted by the court) affords protection for all the Bartok fam-
ily members since members of a class who file for renewal become legal owners of the
copyright which they hold as trustees For the benefit of all members of the class who
are entitled to the renewal. Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent Trends in the Law of Artistic
Property, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 523, 334-35 (1957).
Hi
 American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1956).
g? 523 F.2d at 948.
68 Id. at 953 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 942 n.2. See text at notes 105-11 infra.
g° 523 F.2d at 950-51.
°' Id. at 952.
gg "It must be assumed 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning' of words used in the statute and where they have a basic and usual sense,
they require no resort to legislative history." 523 F.2d at 951, quoting United States v.
Blasius, 397 F.2d 203; 205-06 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 (1968).
" 523 F.2d at 952.
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the common meaning of "posthumous work,"" so should the court."
In conclusion, Judge Van Graafeiland advised that the appropriate
course would be to apply the "common usage" definition of "post-
humous work" and await congressional resolution of the issue through
revision of the 1909 Copyright Act."
Perhaps the most influential difference between the majority and
dissenting opinions was their differing views on the equities of the
case. The majority, focusing on the legislative purpose behind enact-
ment of section 24, 97 reasoned that there was no injustice in holding
that the Concerto is not a "posthumous work" since the widow and
family may now execute a contract with the publisher for the renewal
term." Moreover, the majority suggested that the terms of Bartok's
original contract with Boosey mandated a reversion of the copyright
interest irrespective of Bartok's death prior to the renewal period."
Since clear evidence of an intent to assign the renewal rights is re-
quired for an effective assignment of those rights,"° the majority im-
plied that even if Bartok was alive at the time for renewal, his original
assignment to Boosey did not convey the renewal rights."' The ma-
jority further pointed out that had wartime conditions not hindered
the printing process, the Concerto would have been copyrighted during
Bartok's lifetime and, since Bartok's death preceded the renewal
" The Office has defined "posthumous works" as "works published and
copyrighted after the death of the author." United States Copyright Office, Circular
No. 15 (1953).
96
	
523 F.2d at 952 (dissenting opinion). The minority cited authorities hold-
ing that the court should give deference to the interpretation of a statute by the agency
charged with its administration. Id. For example, the Supreme Court upheld the
Copyright Office's determination that .a statuette could be registered as a work of fine
art in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213-14 (1954).
°A 523 F.2d at 952, 954 (dissenting opinion). In support of his contention that the
majority wrongfully performed a legislative function by defining "posthumous" as it
did, the dissenter quoted Justice Frankfurter's statement that "Monstruction is not legis-
lation and must avoid ... retrospective expansion of meaning." Id. at 953, quoting
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944). However, Justice
Frankfurter was referring to a statute—the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938—in
which the legislature described the exemptions in great detail. See 322 U.S. at 618.
97 The court's reasoning suggests that since the legislature predicated the renewal
section on the case of outright sale of the copyright by the author, the court should in-
terpret the statute based on that situation. See 523 F.2d at 944 & n.4. Therefore, con-
sideration of the effect of an assignment of copyright subject to the payment of royal-
des was unnecessary. See id. The dissent disagreed, however, and focused on the facts
presented in the Bartok situation. 523 F.2d at 949, 953-54 (dissenting opinion).
°A 523 F.2d at 944. Since § 24 provides that the renewal rights in a nonpost-
humous work vest in the widow and children if the author dies prior to the renewal
period, regardless of any previous assignment by the author of the renewal term, the
congressional purpose behind the "posthumous work" exception is in accord with the
sentiment that the widow and family are capable of protecting themselves by executing
a contract for copyright when the author did not negotiate such an agreement. Id. at
949 n.12.
"Id.
'°° Id. See note 59 supra.
'w See id.
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period, the renewal rights clearly would have vested in his widow and
children.'°2
Judge Van Graafeiland disagreed, viewing the case as one be-
tween a covetous son and his helpless mother-1 °3 (the "distraught
widow"), and strongly objected to the "injustice [done] to Mr. Bartok's
widow."'" He argued that Mr. Bartok's intent, as evidenced by provi-
sions in his will, should control.'" Under the terms of the will, upon
which Mrs. Bartok, Peter Bartok and Boosey patterned their royalty
agreement in 1949, 1 " the payments negotiated by Bartok and
Boosey'° 7
 would be distributed in full to Mrs. Bartok during her
lifetime with the remainder then going to her sons.'° 8 This is the re-
sult which would have obtained if the court had not retroactively ap-
plied its decision to the present case and if it then recognized the
1949 agreement.'° 9
 Thus, the majority's plan of equal distribution of
the royalty proceeds" in effect deprived Mrs. Bartok of two-thirds of
the royalties to which she would have otherwise been entitled.'"
An ultimate decision as to whether the majority's or the dissent-
ing judge's definition of "posthumous work" is correct involves many
considerations. Since the Copyright Act does not define "posthumous
work" and since all of the court's attempts in Bartok to find legislative
rationales to support the exception are subject to criticisms, the possi-
bility exists of "legislative oversight in including it among the pro-
prietor renewals."' Indeed, the majority in Bartok suggested this pos-
14 See id. at 947 n.10.
1 °3 "Bela- Bartok, as a loving and thoughtful husband, executed a will in which he
left the royalties from all copyrights and renewal copyrights in trust for his widow with
the remainder, upon her death, to his son Peter, the appellant herein. Apparently, ap-
pellant is unwilling to wait for his remainder to accrue." 523 F.2d at 949 (dissenting
opinion).
Aside from the majority opinion's validation of Peter Bartok's claim of legal
right, it is possible to hypothesize situations suggestive of collusion between Peter and
his mother in bringing the suit. For example: Mrs. Bartok, along with Peter, may have
wanted a judicial declaration on whether the Concerto is a posthumous work for the
purpose of determining the validity of the 1949 agreement. See text at notes 134-38
infra.
1 ° 1 523 F.2d at 949 (dissenting opinion).
l°3
 Id.
'°° See text at notes 134-38 infra.
'°' While the royalty provisions negotiated by Bartok appear to be adequate, see
523 F.2d at 954 n.8, the dissent failed to recognize that an unscrupulous publisher
might have taken advantage of Bartok since he was ill and impoverished.
108 523 F.2d at 949 (dissenting opinion).
'°8
	 note 138 infra.	 .
"° See 523 F.2d at 942 n.2.
"' Id. at 949, 953-54 (dissenting opinion). It appears that Judge Van Graafeiland
misinterpreted the law, however, since section 24 lays out the scheme by which the re-
newal interest is transferred upon the author's death prior to the renewal period, re-
gardless of any attempted assignment by the author. 17 U.S.C. 11 24 (1970). Thus, rights
in the renewal copyright will not pass to the author's widow or children according to
the terms of any testamentary disposition. See note 50 supra.
1 " 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 1 114.1 (1975). Barbara Ringer, present
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sibility by indicating that the courts could not apply all of the excep-
tions in section 24 since the "corporate body" provision, for example,
is "practically meaningless."" 3 Nevertheless, since section 24 does in-
clude the "posthumous work" exception, all means of ascertaining the
legislative intent in including a "posthumous work" among the excep-
tions to the general renewal scheme must be considered.
Neither the courts nor the legal commentators have agreed upon
a settled definition of "posthumous work." The only judicial statement
on "posthumous work" prior to Bartok was Judge Learned Hand's dic-
tum in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan:"" " 'posthumous' works, [are]
... those on which the original copyright has been taken out by
someone to whom the literary property passed before publication."" 5
The precise meaning of this definition depends on the interpretation
of the word "passed." One view holds that "passed" refers to any type
of transfer, including the author's conveyance by contract prior to his
death.'" The other view rejects inclusion of the author's conveyance
by contract, arguing that if "passed" means any type of transfer, then
all assignments of common law copyrights involve a "posthumous
work" since no reference is made by Judge Hand to the death of the
author.'" To avoid the inference that Judge Hand intended to defeat
the statutory renewal scheme's protection of the author and his fam-
ily, the preferable interpretation is to include within his definition of
"posthumous work" only those works on which the right to copyright
passed by will or intestacy.'" In any event, however, this single state-
ment by Judge Hand falls far short of establishing a judicial definition
of "posthumous work."
Register of Copyrights, observed that the exception for posthumous works was "spliced
onto the renewal provision as one of the works which the proprietor could renew in his
own right, but without definition or regard for the consequences. As a result, both the
meaning of the term 'posthumous work and its consequences in the renewal section are
obscure." B. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 524 (1963).
Professor Nimmer remarked that "Whe preference of proprietor over author, or neces-
sarily in this instance, his widow and children ... seems least justified in the case of
posthumous works. It is precisely in the publication of such works that the author's
family may most rely for financial support." 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
§ 114.1 (1975).
A bill is currently before Congress which would abolish the two-term system and
thus eliminate the problems of the "posthumous works" exception. See note 40 supra.
"8 523 F.2d at 948. See Note, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 607 (1976).
"' 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941). This case dealt with an employee for hire. Id. at
698.
"8 1d. at 699.
"I' Bartok, 523 F.2d at 952 (dissenting opinion); Bricker, Renewal and Extension of
Copyright, 29 S. CAL L. REV. 23, 38-39 (1955). While Bricker agrees with this interpreta-
tion, he nevertheless denies that an acceptable reason exists for the defeat of the statu-
tory beneficiaries' rights in this case. Id. at 39. See also B. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in
STUDIES IN COPYRIGHT 503, 524-25 (1963).
"I 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 114.1 (1975).
"8 Bartok, 523 F.2d at 947; 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT 114.1 (1975);
Note, 44 CoLum. L. REV. 712, 715 (1944).
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Application of the canons of statutory construction is similarly
inconclusive: One rule of statutory interpretation is that "it must be
assumed that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of words used in a statute.""° However, there is not one de-
finitive "ordinary meaning" of "posthumous." Although the dissenting
opinion in Bartok cited numerous examples defining "posthumous" as
"published after the death of the author," 12 ° the majority remarked
that another common usage of "posthumous" refers to a child born
after his father's death.'" Moreover, the Supreme Court in De Sylva
v. Ballentine 122 rejected the application of this rule of statutory con-
struction to section 24 by explaining that "rt]he statute is hardly un-
ambiguous, however, and presents problems of interpretation not
solved by literal application of words as they are 'normally' used." 123
Another general principle of statutory interpretation is that a
court should defer to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute made
by the agency charged with its administration.'" However, this rule of
construction should not apply to the Copyright Office's interpreta-
tions (the Office defined a "posthumous work" as one "published and
copyrighted after the death of the author" 122) since the Copyright Of-
fice is not an administrative agency and does not have the power to
give legal opinions or advice.'" It is primarily an office of record,
similar to a register of deeds.'" Thus, the Copyright Office customar-
ily allows registration by conflicting claimants without making a de-
termination of the validity of their claims,'" and any conclusions of
" 1' United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. dismissed,
393 U.S. 1008 (1969); accord, Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n., Inc., 390 U.S.
459, 465 (1967). However, judicial acceptance of this rule is not complete: "The notion
that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely a per-
nicious oversimplication." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Co., 322 U.S. 607, 637
(1944) (dissenting opinion).
120
 523 F.2d at 950-51 (dissenting opinion).
I" Id. at 945 n.6. As so defined, it obviously has no relation to the copyrighting
of a work; Bartok's Concerto was not "born" after its father's death—it was "a creation
conceived, born and very much made known to the world during its progenitor's
lifetime." Id. See Brief for the Author's League of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 7,
Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
"2
 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
123 1d. at 573. In deciding whether the illegitimate child of an author is entitled to
share in the renewal proceeds with the widow, the Court interpreted the phrase
"widow, widower or children of the author" in § 24 to mean "widow, widower and
children of the author" so that the surviving spouse and children (both legitimate and
illegitimate) take the renewal rights as a class, rather than the widow or widower taking
to the exclusion of the children. Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
' 24 Id. at 577-78.
"8 United States Copyright Office, Circular No. 15 (1953).
1 " 37 C.F.R. § 201.2 (a)(1)(1975). See Register of Copyrights, Circular 113.
'" United States ex rel. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Bouve, 33 F. Supp. 462,
463 (D.D.C. 1940); Register of Copyrights, Circular 1B.
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972). This was done in Bartok.
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law it may draw are not binding on the court.' 29 Consistent with this
view, the Court in De Sylva also held, that no weight could be given to
the Copyright Office's interpretation of the phrase "widows, widowers
or children" in section 24 since considerable ambiguity surrounded
the meaning of these words.' 3 ° This approach equally applies to the
Copyright Office's definition of "posthumous work" which unques-
tionably is an attempt to resolve a legal issue of similar doubt.
Professor Nimmer suggests that the interpretation of an am-
biguous statute such as the Copyright Act should not focus on the
view held by an administrative agency or a legal commentator. Rather,
he submits, emphasis should be placed on the manner in which those
persons who are directly affected by the statute perceive it since they
will conduct their affairs in accordance with that view.'" As a general
rule, certainly neither the composer nor the publisher considers that
he is dealing with a "posthumous work" when he drafts a contract for
the original copyright term. 132 Consequently, the living author does
not demand compensation from the publisher for the latter's right to
renew the work since the author anticipates that the renewal rights
will vest in his family if he dies prior to the renewal period.' 33
This scenario is especially evident in Bartok; it does not appear
that either the family or the publisher regarded the Concerto as a
"posthumous work." In 1949, Boosey, Mrs. Bartok and Peter Bartok
made an agreement which provided that Boosey would pay royalties
during the renewal period in the same amounts as required by
Bartok's agreement with the publisher.' 34 It appears that there would
have been no reason for Boosey to agree to this payment if he viewed
the Concerto as a "posthumous work" since, as the proprietor of a
' 2° United States ex re!. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Bouve, 33 F. Supp. 462,
463 (D.D.C. 1940).
130 351 U.S. at 577-78.
13 ' Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent Trends in the Law of Artistic Property, 4 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 323, 332 (1957).
"I
 523 F.2d at 945 n.6. In determining whether an assignment by the author in-
cludes the right to renew, Itlhe test is the intention of the parties as gleaned from the
writing." Selwyn & Co. v. Veiller, 43 F. Supp. 491, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). It cannot be
conclusively argued that Bartok intended to convey the renewal rights to Boosey. Both
Bartok and Boosey knew Bartok's death was imminent and he would not survive the
twenty-eight years to the renewal period. Thus, as his death prior to the renewal period
would defeat his contingent assignment of renewal rights, an attempt to convey the re-
newal rights cannot be imputed. See note 66 supra. Furthermore, even if Bartok was
not near death, the court need not infer an intent to convey the renewal rights from his
agreement with Boosey, even though he contracted for royalties on a percentage basis.
523 F.2d at 954 n.8 (dissenting opinion). A second chance to benefit from the work is
still warranted in this situation since "the nature of the royalty formula ... and the
numerical amount of the percentage may well vary depending upon the author's bar-
gaining position." 2 M. Ni MMER, THE Law OF COPYRIGHT 113 (1975).
"3 This reasoning is even more persuasive as applied to the facts in Bartok since
the work would have been copyrighted during Bartok's life if wartime conditions had
not delayed the printing process. 523 F.2d at 947.
"4
 523 F.2d at 942 n.2.
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"posthumous work," he would be entitled to the renewal rights "clear
of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the original
copyright."'" The parties arguably might have thought that the roy-
alty provision in Bartok's original contract with the publisher required
continuation of royalty payments through the renewal term even if
the Concerto was a "posthumous work."'" However, if such were the
case, the 1949 agreement would still have been unnecessary since the
royalty obligation would flow from Bartok's original agreement rather
than from any subsequent agreement by the family. It is more likely
that the publisher and family treated the work as nonposthumous.
The 1949 agreement suggests that the parties did not expect the orig-
inal contract for copyright to include the renewal rights.'" Therefore,
the 1949 agreement appears to be the family's assignment of the re-
newal rights.'"
135
 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). The court in Bartok did not decide whether the publisher
receives the renewal on a "posthumous work" free of all obligations to the author's fam-
ily or whether he receives it subject to royalty payments. The dissent did not address
this issue either because he erroneously assumed that Bartok's original contract with the
publisher governed the renewal rights. 523 F.2d at 953-54 (dissenting opinion). See also
id. at 949 n.12.
1a6
	 523 F.2d at .953-54 (dissenting opinion).
'" See Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1943). In Rossiter, the court
reasoned that since the parties executed a subsequent agreement on renewal rights, the
parties could not have intended the original agreement to cover the renewal term. Id. at
911.
138
 Two problems are evident in enforcing this agreement. First, the agreement
provides that the publisher will pay royalties during the renewal period to the estate
which, pursuant to the provisions of Bela Bartok's will, will distribute all the proceeds to
Mrs. Bartok during her lifetime and then to her sons after her death. Bartok, 523 F.2d
at 942 n.2. (There is much disagreement on the terms in this provision of the will. In
conflict with the majority's description of this provision in the will, the dissenter ex-
plained that the remainder was left solely to the son Peter, 523 F.2d at 949 (dissenting
opinion), while the district court stated that Mrs. Bartok was the sole beneficiary under
the will. 382 F. Supp. at 883 n.5.) This agreement may contravene the Court's interpre-
tation of section 24 as requiring that the proceeds from the renewal of a nonposthu-
mous work be divided between the widow, widower and children. De Sylva v. Ballen-
tine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). Secondly, since one son, who was a statutory owner of
the renewal rights, did not sign the 1949 agreement, 523 F.2d at 942 n.2, it is question-
able whether the renewal assignment could be binding on him. The Court in De Sylva
suggested that the assignment would not be binding on one who is entitled to share in
the renewal and did not join in on the assignment. See 351 U.S. at 582. However, dicta
in Easton v. Universal Pictures, Co., 158 U.S.P.Q. 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), indicates
that a renewal assignment by the widow alone would be binding on the children if it
was executed prior to the De'Sylva decision.
The court in Bartok did not directly pass on the validity of the 1949 agreement.
Nor did the Court in De Sylva decide whether all members of the class must join in for
an effective assignment of the renewal rights or if, like the situation of joint authorship,
each member of the class could convey a nonexclusive right. The court in Bartok
seemed to adopt the former view by suggesting that the mother and two sons receive
equal shares of the renewal proceeds. 523 F.2d at 942 n.2. The court thus denied that
the assignment by Peter and his mother conveyed their interest in the work to Boosey
resulting in common ownership of the renewal. copyright between Boosey and the sec-
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It is submitted, however, that neither the definition of Judge
Hand, the definition suggested by the rules of statutory construction,
nor the definition of Professor Nimmer are ultimately adequate. Since
there is no reliable indication of legislative intent for the inclusion of
the "posthumous work" exception, and since there is not a definition
provided by judicial interpretations or the canons of statutory con-
struction, it seems appropriate that in defining a "posthumous work,"
the critical consideration should be, as held by the majority in Bartok,
whether the author executed a binding contract for copyright prior to
his death rather than whether publication or performance occurred
prior to his death. 139 Consistent application of the statute is fostered
by focusing on a legally defined event—the making of a
contract—instead of relying on terms which do "not have the same
legal meaning[s] in all contexts."'" Moreover, this definition effec-
tuates the underlying policy of the Act in protecting the families of
deceased authors. If the author has made a contract, the work is non-
posthumous and, by statute, the family has the opportunity to
negotiate for the renewal term. In the absence of a contract by the au-
thor, the family can execute a contract for the original copyright term
of the "posthumous work." In both situations then, the interests of the
family are protected by their participation in execution of a contract,
original or renewal. This interpretation thus avoids the creation of an
illogical discrimination between families in equally defenseless posi-
tions and prevents an unscrupulous publisher from benefiting at the
family's expense.
and son. This result was not required by De Sylva since the Court did not discuss the
allocation of interest between the widow and children.
It appears that nonrecognition of the 1949 agreement does not result in a frus-
tration of Bartok's intentions as expressed in his will. The renewal rights in other works
which Bartok exercised during his liefetime presumably became assets of his estate
upon his death and were distributed according to the provisions of his will, as were the
proceeds from the original term of the Concerto. Therefore, it seems that Suchoff, the
trustee of Bartok's estate, acted inappropriately when he joined with Boosey in seeking
to have the court declare that the Concerto is a posthumous work.
The Author's League of America, Inc. explained the illogical results which
would occur from acceptance of the dissenter's definition of "posthumous works" as
those for which publication (i.e. first sale and distribution of copies) occurs after the
author's death:
Three generations after an author's death, the unpublished, un-
known score of one of his concertos is found in a trunk. The legatee of his
literary property, a university, grants rights to a publisher. Copyright is
secured by registration under Sec. 12; the work is widely performed and
broadcast; but copies are not sold or distributed. Consequently, under the
District Court's definition that was adopted by the dissenter in the court
of appeals], the work is not "posthumous" although it had been completely
dormant and unknown during the author's life and for three generations
after his death. His executor or next of kin—three generations
removed—would secure the renewal copyright.
Brief for The Author's League of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Bartok v.
Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
' 40
 American Visuals Corp. v. Holland. 239 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1956).
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If the court had defined a "posthumous work" as one published
after the death of the author, as did the district court, a method
would still have been available to protect the family's interest in the
work. The court could have held that any executory contract signed
by the author is void if the work has not been published prior to the
author's death. The author's family or the next succeeding statutory
class could then make a contract for the rights to copyright, with con-
sideration given to the proprietor's rights to the renewal term. The
legislative purpose of "protecting authors and their families""' would
be fulfilled by considerin& this a "'posthumous work" since "the logical
basis for excepting the widow and children from statutory protection
is that, as original proprietors, they would have no need for it. "142
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the majority's definition of "post-
humous work" as a work for which "a contract for copyright was
never executed by the author during his life" 143
 is preferable. This in-
terpretation accords the family greater protection by permitting them
to negotiate for the renewal term during the renewal period—a time
when the value of the renewal copyright is better apt to be
known—rather than negotiating for the renewal term twenty-eight
years earlier when its value is purely speculative.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the majority in Bartok adopted the most equitable
interpretation of "posthumous work" by defining it as a work on
which the right to copyright has passed by will or intestacy.' 44 Since
the focus is on whether the author executed a contract for copyright,
this definition entitles the statutory beneficiaries to negotiate either
the original contract for a "posthumous work" or the renewal contract
for a nonposthumous work. The problem with the Bartok decision,
however, is that the court's reasoning is unpersuasive; the imputed
legislative rationale for inclusion of the "posthumous work" exception
is simply not supported. A copyright revision bill is currently pending
before Congress: 145 it appears that ultimately only congressional
reappraisal of this provision will solve the problems which have arisen
in interpreting the "posthumous work" exception.
ELLEN MILLER WACHTEL
141
 523 F.2d at 944.
' 46 Id. Of course, this creates the same difficulties in assessment of the value of
the renewal term as exists with the majority's definition of "posthumous work." See text
at notes 65-67 supra.
143 523 F.2d at 944.
144 1d. at 947.
146 See note 40 supra.
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